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This paper investigates the link between nationality of ownership and wage elasticities of 
labour demand at the level of the plant.  In particular, we examine whether labour demand 
in multinationals becomes less elastic with respect to the wage if the plant has backward 
linkages with the local economy.  Our empirical evidence, based on a rich plant level 
dataset, shows that the extent of local linkages indeed reduces the wage elasticity of labour 
demand.  This result is economically important and holds for a number of different 
specifications.   
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1 Introduction 
It has been well established in the empirical literature that workers in industrialised 
countries have experienced higher job insecurity over the last decades, both in terms of 
higher volatility of employment spells and earnings (e.g., OECD 1997).  “Globalisation” 
has been made at least partly responsible for these trends, certainly in the popular debate as 
well as among academics (e.g, Rodrik, 1997; Scheve and Slaughter, 2004).  Of all the 
drivers of globalisation - trade, migration of workers, and foreign direct investment (FDI) - 
FDI is probably the most visible.  It is also likely to be, at the margin, the most important 
aspect of globalisation in economic terms.  For instance, over the last two decades global 
FDI flows have grown at least twice as fast as trade, now well exceeding $500 billion and 
resulting in a total stock of more than $8 billion (United Nations, 2004).   
It is not surprising then, that the potential “footloose” nature of FDI in response to 
changes in production costs elsewhere has raised some concern about the jobs created 
through FDI, despite the generally higher wages associated with such employment (see 
Conyon et al., 2002).  As a matter of fact, these fears have recently come to the fore in the 
wake of a number of plant closures by high profile multinationals in Europe, often 
attributed to lower wages elsewhere.  For example, the Japanese multinational  Sony 
announced the closure of one of its plants in Wales in June 2005, with the resulting loss of 
650 jobs due to the availability of lower production costs elsewhere.
1   
It is important to note, however, that the potential “footloose” nature of FDI is only 
one possible response to changes in production costs.
 2  Alternatively, multinationals may, 
rather than completely shutting down production, simply downsize their operations and 
shed labour in the light of the availability of cheaper labour elsewhere.  Thus, if one is to 
                                                 
1 http://www.personneltoday.co.uk/Articles/2005/06/30/30593/Sony+slashes+650+UK+jobs.htm 
2 Bernard and Sjöholm (2003) and Görg and Strobl (2003) find that multinationals have higher exit 
probabilities than comparable domestic plants, a finding in line with this argument.   2 
capture the complete picture of lower job stability in multinationals then one arguably also 
needs to investigate differences in the wage elasticity of multinationals relative to the 
indigenous industry.  In this regard, there are only a few studies which compare the wage 
elasticity of labour demand in multinationals and domestic firms.  Fabbri et al. (2003) 
discuss the issue and illustrate the theory with a standard neo-classical labour demand 
framework.  Their idea is quite straightforward: multinationals are part of global production 
networks and, within these networks, can more easily transfer production in response to 
changes in costs (in particular wages).  Using industry level data they find an increase in 
wage elasticities of labour demand (conditional on output) over time for low skilled US and 
UK manufacturing workers and argue that increased activity of multinationals may be 
partially responsible for this.  By contrast Barba-Navaretti et al (2003) in a cross country 
firm level study of a group of European countries find that, in most countries, 
multinationals adjust their labour demand more rapidly than domestic firms in response to 
shocks, but have a more inelastic demand curve with respect to wages.  They argue that 
multinationals have a more rigid demand for labour due to differences in skill structure.
3 
  The current paper re-examines the link between nationality of ownership and the 
wage elasticity of labour demand, but specifically investigates whether efforts at integrating 
multinationals in the local economy through backward linkages can reduce their volatile 
nature by affecting their elasticity of labour demand.
4,5  Our argument that this is likely to 
be the case rests on the idea that locally purchased inputs may be more difficult to 
substitute for labour than other inputs.  This may be plausible under the assumption that 
                                                 
3 The paper by Konings and Murphy (2001) is also somewhat related.  They look at the extent to which 
multinationals substitute employment towards parent plants in response to wage changes.  They find evidence 
of substitution between EU parent firms and their subsidiaries rather than towards low wage subsidiaries 
outside the EU.  In addition, Slaughter (2001) looks at labour demand elasticities in the US to see whether 
increased openness to trade has increased the demand elasticity and found little support for this hypothesis. 
4 We do not consider plant exit in this paper.   
5 Our paper is, hence, also related to the recent literature on productivity spillovers from FDI, which argues 
that spillovers are most likely to occur through multinationals’ backward linkages with domestic suppliers 
(Javorcik, 2004).    3 
locally sourced inputs are to some degree "specific" due to, e.g., better quality and 
availability, or lower transport costs than imported inputs.  To discuss these points in more 
detail we present a simple framework that highlights how such channels are likely to affect 
labour demand.  
  Using a rich plant level data set for manufacturing plants in the Republic of 
Ireland we then empirically investigate whether wage elasticities depend on the extent of 
local backward linkages and whether this is more important for foreign multinationals than 
for indigenous firms.  Arguably, Ireland is a particularly interesting case study in this 
regard given that its manufacturing industry is heavily dependent on foreign multinationals, 
and also the fact that foreign plants account for about half of total employment.  Moreover, 
Ireland has operated a number of explicit policy programmes to foster linkages between 
foreign multinationals and domestic suppliers (Ruane, 2001).   
  The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 provides the 
theoretical background for our analysis.  Section 3 outlines the empirical approach, and 
Section 4 describes the data sources.  The empirical results are discussed in Section 5 while 
Section 6 concludes.   
 
2 Theoretical background 
  We consider a foreign owned plant as a subsidiary of a multinational firm that has 
already decided to locate the plant, thereby incurring fixed costs, and also has an upward 
sloping marginal cost curve.  Because the firm has several plants in different locations we 
assume the plant is a price taker and the multinational firm will minimise costs by 
equalising marginal costs across all plants.  The head office may have market power and 
will equalise marginal costs across all plants.  Thus the subsidiary will look like a textbook 
competitive firm where the plant manager has to maximise profits choosing output at a   4 
price fixed by head office, where the price equals the marginal cost of plants in other 
locations.  This means that for a foreign affiliate located in a host country we assume the 
impact of an increase in local wages on the firms output price, which is a function of the 
firm’s global production costs, to be negligible.  The plant is hence will have a fixed price, 
a u-shaped average cost curve due to fixed costs and increasing marginal costs.
6 
  In order to illustrate our argument as to why backward linkages with domestic 
suppliers may impact on labour demand elasticities we summarise the well known neo-
classical conditional labour demand model.
7  A price taking affiliate has a production 
function with n inputs: 
) ,... ( 1 n x x f y =           (1) 
The price of each factor i is wi and total costs are  n nx w x w x w F c + + + = ... 2 2 1 1 .  The 
Lagrangian function for cost minimisation is: 
)] .. ( [ .. 1 2 2 1 1 n n n x x f y x w x w x w - + + + = l l     (2) 
The share of any factor j in variable costs is sj.  The elasticity of substitution between labour 
(factor 1) and any other factor j is s1j.   
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6 The plant may make profits in contrast to a competitive firm since we do not expect free entry to dissipate 
profits. 
7 See also Fabbri et al. al (2003) who use this framework to motivate differences in labour demand elasticities 
between foreign and domestic owned firms, or Hammermesh (1993) for a more general discussion.   5 
Other things equal, equation (3) tells us that the labour demand elasticity is determined by 
two aspects, namely, the elasticity of substitution between labour and the other factor j, and 
the share of factor j.
8   
There are a number of issues with regard to (3) that are important to point out for 
our task at hand.  First, with regard to labour’s share in total cost, since theoretical 
frameworks outlining multinational firms suggest that such firms will have fixed costs (e.g. 
Markusen, 2002), one should be wary about looking at labour’s share in output as a proxy 
for s, as it is labour’s share in variable costs that is relevant to the demand elasticity.  For 
example, affiliates whose parent has incurred significant advertising or R&D costs may 
have very high output per worker, so that labour costs may be a small share of output but a 
much larger share of variable costs.   
Equation (3) also suggests that, if locally purchased inputs are more difficult to 
substitute for l abour than other inputs (low s) firms that purchase more local inputs will 
have smaller elasticities.  This may be plausible under the assumption that locally sourced 
inputs are to some degree "specific" due to, e.g., better quality and availability, or lower 
transport costs than imported inputs.  As an example, a multinational firm switching 
sourcing from a supplier abroad to a local is then in a better position to obtain specific 
design or quality standards, perhaps with the help of providing assistance t o the local 
supplier in the first instance.
9  Therefore,  it may  be less likely to substitute the locally 
sourced input for labour than the previously imported input.
10   
                                                 
8 While equation (3) is well known we derive it explicitly in the Appendix to point out two important points 
that will be relevant to our analysis.  First while much of the literature using equation (3) assumes constant 
returns to scale, this is not necessary.  Secondly, sl is labour’s share of variable costs, not total costs.  A firm 
may incur non-recoverable fixed costs, e.g., from advertising or R&D, or other start-up costs to enhance 
output per worker but these will not affect the calculation in equation (3). 
9 Moran (2001) provides plenty of case studies between foreign subsidiaries and domestic suppliers and 
provides evidence of such assistance.   
10 An additional possible explanation is that firms that locate close to an input source do so partly because 
local inputs are more difficult to substitute for, and that these may often be inputs such as agricultural 
commodities in food and drink production etc.  Think of a foreign owned producer of a food or drink product 
who would find it difficult to substitute away from labour with a software firm who has skilled labour to some   6 
One of Marshalls well known rules of labour demand is that it will be less elastic 
the more elastic is the supply of other inputs.
11  The intuition is that if the supply of another 
input (say capital) is steep, a rise in wages will increase the demand for capital as firms 
substitute from labour into capital, but this will drive up the price of capital limiting the 
degree to which firms will substitute.  For the two factor case, Appendix 2 shows how an 
increase in the price of the other factor reduces the conditional demand elasticity, 




11 w w s h s h - - =                 (4) 
The two factor analogue of (3) is  2
*
11 s s h - =  and 
1 2w w h  is the percentage change in 
the price of factor 2 (w2) associated with a percentage change in w1.  A rise in wages (price 
of factor 1) will induce firms to substitute from labour into other inputs.  To the extent that 
these are purchased in the domestic economy firms will increase the demand for such 
inputs and drive up the price, hence limiting the extent of substitution away from labour.  
Firms who substitute from labour into inputs sourced abroad would not expect the same to 
be true if a small country has little impact on the world price of that factor.  Hence, their 
labour demand should be more elastic with respect to the wage rate than that of firms using 
local inputs.   
Fabbri et. al (2003) argue that multinationals may have more elastic demand than 
domestic firms because firms with global production networks may be able to more easily 
import intermediate goods that could alternatively be produced by domestic labour.  They 
argue that this is especially likely if a firm is vertically integrated internationally and 
different plants engage in intra-firm trade.  To see how this argument fits into our 
                                                                                                                                                     
degree at a fixed output level.  (Kennedy, 1991) provides evidence that backward linkages in the former 
industry are much higher than in most other manufacturing industries, including the computer industry.)  
However, in the econometric analysis below we focus on within firm changes, rather than differences across 
sectors, hence this explanation is less relevant to our analysis.   
11 See Hicks (1968) Appendix to chapter XI for a formal derivation in the constant returns to scale case, and 
Hamermesh (1993) for a more general discussion.   7 
framework we assume that the multinational subsidiary produces two outputs y1 and y2 
where y2 is an intermediate input which can be produced in the subsidiary or imported at a 
fixed marginal cost from another branch of the company and y1 is output of the final good.  
We assume the firm has two separate production functions for the two goods within the 
plant for simplicity where a1 is the fraction of the workforce producing the final good and 
a2 the fraction producing the intermediate good.  If we estimate the demand elasticity for 
the plant holding final output fixed this does not condition on output of the intermediate 





* ) 1 ( ll ll ll a a h h h - + =               (5) 
where 
1 *
ll h  is the conditional demand elasticity for employment of the final good and 
2
ll h  is 
the unconditional demand for the intermediate good which for a given elasticity of 
substitution may be substantially larger than the conditional elasticity
12.  We might 
speculate that their conjecture that firms can easily transfer some stages of production to 
another subsidiary for a given final output would be less relevant for firms that purchase a 
large share of primary inputs locally. 
 
3 Description of the data 
The preceding discussion illustrates that there are plausible reasons why one might 
expect the source of inputs to matter for foreign firms’ labour demand elasticities.  We now 
turn to examining this issue empirically.  The data for our analysis are taken from the Irish 
Economy Expenditure Survey (IEE), undertaken annually by Forfas, the government agency 
                                                 
12 Appendix A3 derives the unconditional elasticity for the two factor case and a production function that is 








+ - = s h while the two 
factor analogue of the conditional elasticity is  2
*
11 s s h - = .  While si represents the share of variable costs in 
one case and output in the other clearly the unconditional elasticity may be much larger.   8 
with responsibility for enterprise development, science and technology.  This is an annual 
survey of plants in Irish manufacturing with at least 20 employees, although a plant, once it 
is included, is generally still surveyed even if its employment level falls below the 20 
employee cut-off point.  The survey provides plant level information on, inter alia, output, 
employment, nationality of ownership, as well as details on plants' expenditure on labour 
and other inputs.
13  The response rate to this survey is generally estimated to be between 60 
and 80 per cent of the targeted plant population.   
The data cover the period 1983-1998 and provide an unbalanced panel for 2,675 
plants.  Foreign-owned plants are defined in the data as those that are majority owned by 
foreign shareholders.  A look at the data shows that total exits over this period in our data 
only account for 3.3 percent of total plants.  By way of summary statistics, Figure 1 shows 
the development of total employment in foreign and domestic plants in Irish manufacturing 
over the sample period.  One should note that employment in foreign-owned plants has 
increased more rapidly than domestic employment, with a growth from around 58,000 to 
almost 100,000 employees in 1998.   
[Figure 1 here] 
The IEE survey also includes information on plants’ expenditure on intermediate 
inputs and breaks this down into domestically sourced and imported intermediates and we 
use this information to calculate our measure of local sourcing.  More precisely, we 
calculate a linkage indicator as the percentage of inputs sourced locally (see, e.g., Görg and 
Strobl, 2002; Kennedy, 1991; Cohen, 1973).  Table 1 shows the development of total 
backward linkages in 1983 and 1998 respectively by NACE 2 digit industry.   
[Table 1 here] 
                                                 
13 Note that the dataset does not allow us to distinguish skill groups for workers, thus we treat labour as 
homogeneous.     9 
One should note, firstly, that foreign-owned plants on average have lower linkages 
than domestic plants, although there are some of exceptions (e.g., 19 - leather, in 1998).  
Moreover, the table highlights sectoral differences with the highest linkages occurring for 
domestic plants in sectors 30 (computers & office machinery) in 1983 and 15 (food & 
beverages) in 1998, and for foreign plants in sectors 27 (basic metals) in 1983 and 19 
(leather) in 1998.  As expected, there are significant differences in linkages between foreign 
and domestic plants, most noteworthy perhaps in sector 30 (office machinery) in 1983, 
although this difference has all but disappeared in 1998.  The table also shows that for 
multinationals, backward linkages have generally increased over the 1983 to 1998 period.  
This may at least in part reflect the emphasis of the National Linkage Programme in Ireland 
on creating linkages between foreign multinationals and local suppliers (Ruane, 2001).     
 
4 Estimating labour demand elasticities 
4.1 Differences between foreign and domestic plants 
The first step in our empirical analysis is to establish whether in our dataset there 
are differences in labour demand elasticities between domestic and foreign owned plants.  
In order to do so we specify the following dynamic conditional labour demand function for 
plant i in year t, 
it i t it it it it it s it it e d d xy xw x y w L L + + + + + + + + = - ) ( ) ( 3 2 1 3 2 1 b b b a a a   (7) 
where  L,  w, and  y are logged values of employment, wages per head, and output, 
respectively.  The variables  dt,  di, and  e are time specific effects, plant specific time 
invariant effects, and an i.i.d. error term, respectively; all unobservable to the 
econometrician.
14  Depending on observations per plant one may want to include up to t-s 
                                                 
14 A static version of the equation including only w and y can be derived from a Cobb-Douglas production 
function using labour and capital as inputs.  The cost of capital is difficult to measure at the plant level.  We   10 
lagged dependent variable in the equation, since, arguably, labour demand may be dynamic 
in nature because of a non-smooth adjustment process in plants' employment policy (see, 
for example, Hamermesh, 1993).  One should note in this regard, that while we 
experimented with several lags these only proved to be significant up to t-2, and we thus 
report on results for specifications including lags t-1 and t-2 of the dependent variable.   x in 
(7) is a dummy variable equal to one if a plant is foreign-owned and zero otherwise.  This 
variable is interacted with w and y to allow for nationality of ownership differences in the 
wage and output elasticity. 
In terms of estimation of equation (7) one should note that simply using OLS is 
likely to prove problematic.  Specifically, employment is likely to be simultaneously 
determined with output and may also affect plant level wages if the plant is not a price taker 
in the local labour market.  If such an endogeneity bias were time invariant then simply first 
differencing the data would provide a possible solution.  However, given the length of the 
panel of individual plants (up to 15 years) this is unlikely to be the case.
15  In order to take 
account of this problem while also controlling for plant specific fixed effects, we thus resort 
to using the now popular GMM systems estimator developed by Blundell and Bond (1998).  
Accordingly, one simultaneously estimates first differenced and level versions of the 
estimating equation, where for the former appropriately lagged values and for the latter 
appropriately lagged differences of the endogenous variables can serve as valid 
instruments.  The validity of these instruments can be tested using a Sargan-type test.  The 
consistency of our estimates also rests on the assumption that there is no second order 
correlation of the residuals of the first-differenced equation.  The standard procedure to 
verify this is to use an AR(2) test on the residuals developed by Arellano and Bond (1991). 
                                                                                                                                                     
assume that the cost of capital is the same for all plants in the economy and is, hence, captured by time 
dummies. 
15 The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable would render a simple fixed estimator inappropriate in this 
context.   11 
The results of estimating equation (7) are reported in Table 2.  One should note, 
firstly, that the Sargan test provides some support for our instruments.  As pointed out 
above, consistency of the estimates also relies on no second order autocorrelation.  The 
AR(2) test indicates, reassuringly, that we cannot reject the hypothesis of no second order 
autocorrelation at conventional levels of statistical significance.  Turning to the results, we 
find from column (1) that the wage and output elasticities look economically sensible – 
they are negative and positive, respectively, and statistically significant in both cases.  The 
point estimates are also well within the range of those generally found in the literature (e.g., 
Barba Navaretti et al., 2003).  More importantly, the significant coefficients on the 
interaction terms suggest that multinationals respond differently to wage changes in terms 
of their demand for labour.  Specifically, the wage elasticity for multinationals is higher (in 
absolute terms) than for domestic plants; a result found by Barba Navaretti et al. (2003) for 
Finland and Sweden.  We do not find any statistically significant differences in the output 
elasticities, however.  Column (2) provides a robustness check, allowing for further lags in 
the wage and output variables.  However, we still find statistically significantly higher 
wage elasticities for multinationals compared to domestic plants.  Overall, the results thus 
far seem to suggest that it is more reasonable to estimate the effect of linkages on 
elasticities separately for domestic and foreign plants.    
[Table 2 here] 
 
4.2 Linkages and labour demand 
If multinationals have higher labour demand elasticities than domestic firms it may 
indeed be the case that they are more likely to reduce labour demand than comparable 
domestic plants if labour costs increase.   The issue now becomes whether further 
integration of multinationals through local linkages may provide a counter force to this, and   12 
as discussed in Section 2, there may be reasons to think that it does.  In order to investigate 
this issue we examine whether labour demand elasticities depend on the degree to which 
multinationals are integrated into the local economy.  More specifically, we estimate a 
dynamic conditional labour demand function, similar to equation (7) as 
it i t it it it it it s it it e d d y link w link link y w L L + + + + + + + + = - ) * ( ) * ( 3 2 1 3 2 1 l l l g g g  
                      (8) 
where link is the measure of local linkages which is interacted with w and y.  Hence, 
it link) ( 2 2 l g +  represents the wage elasticity of labour demand, which by construction 
depends on the degree of local linkages.  The crucial point of the analysis is, hence, whether 
2 l  is statistically significantly different from zero.   
Table 3 shows the results of estimating equation (8) for different groups of plants.  
Column (1) reports elasticities based on the full sample of plants, including foreign and 
domestic owned establishments.  The results indicate that there is no statistically significant 
impact of linkages on the wage elasticity of labour demand for the overall sample.  
However, breaking down the total sample into that of domestic and foreign plants reveals 
some interesting differences across nationality of ownership.  Specifically, the estimates in 
column (2) show that for foreign owned multinationals the wage elasticity increases with 
the level of local linkages, in line with our expectations discussed in Section 2.  By 
contrast, in column (3) one discovers for domestic plants that there are no statistically 
significant effects of local linkages on the wage elasticity.  This could perhaps reflect the 
fact that domestic plants source different types of inputs locally, which may be easily 
substitutable for local labour, hence there may be no effect of increased linkages on the 
elasticity.
16 
                                                 
16 Unfortunately our dataset does not distinguish different types of inputs, hence we cannot follow up this 
conjecture with further analysis.     13 
Using the point estimates in column (2) implies that the wage elasticity of labour 
demand for a foreign owned plant with zero linkages is 0.412, whereas a plant with a mean 
level of local linkages has a wage elasticity of 0.362.  Increasing the degree of linkages by 
two standard deviations from the mean then implies a further reduction in the elasticity to 
0.303.  Hence, the estimated coefficients are not only statistically, but also economically, 
significant.
17  One may want to notice also that even if a foreign plant had a linkage 
coefficient of 1 its wage elasticity would still be substantially higher (at 0.294) than that of 
a domestic plant (at 0.223).  Hence, while linkages may help to reduce the elasticity they 
are not enough to explain away the higher elasticities in foreign than in domestic plants.   
[Table 3 here] 
 
Robustness checks 
One possible concern with the estimation above is that labour demand elasticities 
may depend on size of the plant (Hamermesh and Pfann, 1996) and our results may 
therefore just reflect the fact that multinationals are generally larger than domestic plants, 
and that larger firms have higher linkages (as found by Görg and Ruane, 2001 and Alfaro 
and Rodriguez-Clare, 2004).  There are a number of arguments to counter this concern.  
Firstly, size is taken into account in the labour demand equation, although of course the 
standard specification does not allow the wage elasticity to depend on size.  Secondly, the 
link variable as well as its interaction with output and wages is treated as endogenous in our 
system GMM estimations, to deal with the potential criticism of the effect of correlated 
unobserved characteristics that may affect the elasticity.  Hence, we would argue that our 
results do not just reflect the impact of unobserved characteristics.  However, we also 
provide a robustness check to deal more directly with the issue of plant size.  We classify 
                                                 
17 In 1998, the mean ratio of locally sourced inputs over total inputs for foreign owned plants is 0.42 (see 
Table 1), the standard deviation is 0.25.     14 
plants into three size categories: small, medium and large (the exact definition is given 
below Table 4) and estimate equation (8) on these different samples separately.  Table 4 
presents these results for foreign multinationals and domestic plants.
18  Our findings on the 
effect of linkages for multinationals still hold.  While we indeed find that wage elasticity 
differs by size class we also find that for all size groups, increased linkages are associated 
with reductions in these elasticities.  Hence, our previous findings are not just reflections of 
the fact that we do not take into account size differences in the estimation of wage 
elasticities.   
[Table 4 here] 
Another robustness check concerns our measure of linkages.  Rodriguez-Clare 
(1996) argues that the indicator of locally sourced inputs over total inputs may not be an 
appropriate indicator of local linkages for the purpose of gauging multinationals’ effects on 
local development.  Assuming that multinationals are likely to be more intensive users of 
intermediates than domestic firms he shows in his theoretical model that in order to 
measure the relative importance of multinationals’ local linkages what matters is the ratio 
of domestically sourced inputs relative to employment in the plant.
19  However, his model 
is about the effect of linkages on output in the economy and the linkage index is derived for 
that purpose.  Given that we are interested in labour demand it is not clear, therefore, 
whether this index should be considered superior to our linkage measure in our context.  
Nevertheless, in order to take this issue into account, we define an alternative measure of 
                                                 
18 Note that the test statistics for AR(2) are problematic for samples of small foreign and domestic plants.  
Hence these results should be interpreted with caution.  We did not search for different sets of instruments so 
that we can have the same set of instruments across all specifications in the paper.   
19 Alfaro and Rodriguez-Clare (2004) present empirical evidence using firm level data for a number of Latin 
American countries on this proposition.  They show that multinationals indeed have higher intensities of 
intermediate inputs compared to domestic firms.     15 
local linkages as a plant’s inputs sourced in Ireland relative to its employment and use this 
in our labour demand estimation.
20   
Estimating equation (8) using this definition of linkages does not change our 
conclusion, as shown in Table 5.
21  We still find a statistically significant and positive 
coefficient on the wage interaction term in column (1), indicating that foreign owned plants 
reduce their wage elasticity of labour demand with increasing integration into the local 
economy.  This is not the case for domestic plants, however.  Again using the point 
estimates the results in column (1) suggest that the wage elasticity for a foreign plant with 
mean level of local linkage is 0.349, compared with an estimated elasticity of 0.362 for 
plants with zero linkages.  Increasing the linkage coefficient by two standard deviations 
from the mean leads to a further reduction to 0.298.
22 
[Table 5 here] 
Another issue stems from the unbalanced nature of our panel data which contains 
exit, so that if the probability of exit were correlated with degree of local linkages and 
employment then our results may be biased.  For example, foreign multinationals may have 
more sunk costs the more integrated they are into the local economy and hence may be less 
likely to exit. However, exiting plants are also likely to adjust their employment differently 
prior to exit.  As argued in Section 3, there is very little exit in our data and, hence, it may 
be considered negligible in our analysis.  Regardless, we report some additional 
specifications to ensure that are our results are not biased due to plant exit.  In this regard, 
Columns (1) to (3) of Table 6 report regressions on the sample of surviving plants only, 
                                                 
20 In the data appendix we provide some summary statistics for this measure of linkages similar to Table 1. 
21 One interesting difference between the results in Tables 3 and 5 is the difference in the sign on the local 
linkages term on its own.  It is statistically significant and positive in the former, yet negative in the latter set 
of regressions.  This is likely to reflect the differences in measurement, where the second indicator takes into 
account that there may be differences in the intensity of input use between domestic and foreign-owned 
plants.  However, it is reassuring to note that the impact of linkages on the wage elasticity of labour demand is 
unaffected by the choice of linkage coefficient. 
22 In 1998, the mean level of locally sourced inputs per employee in foreign owned plants is 64.7, the standard 
deviation is 126.5.     16 
thus excluding exitors, Columns (4) to (6) include a dummy variable equal to 1 in the year 
prior to plant exit, and Columns (7) to (9) include a dummy equal to 1 for the whole 
lifetime of a plant that exits the data.  While we find that the dummy variables are all 
statistically significant, we also find that the positive and statistically significant coefficient 
on the interaction of linkage and wages for foreign-owned plants i s robust in all three 
estimations, with magnitudes similar to that found in Table 3.  Moreover, once controlling 
for exit by including dummy variables there are statistically significant and positive 
interaction terms for domestic plants also.  Hence, our  result that higher local linkages 
decrease wage elasticities of labour demand is robust to the different ways of dealing with 
the potential bias introduced through plants exiting the dataset. 
[Table 6 here] 
Finally, Table 7 provides a further robustness check, estimating variants of equation 
(8) including additional lags for w and y.  These estimations show that the result on wage 
elasticities remains for foreign owned plants.  Furthermore, they suggest that labour 
demand in domestic plants also becomes less elastic with respect to the wage rate as 
linkages increase.   
[Table 7 here] 
 
6 Conclusions 
This paper investigates the link between nationality of ownership and labour 
demand elasticities at the level of the plant.  In particular, we examine whether labour 
demand in multinationals (or other domestic firms) becomes less elastic if a plant has 
backward linkages with the local economy.  We have in mind the simple idea that locally 
purchased inputs may be more difficult to substitute for labour than other inputs, due to the 
very nature of the inputs.  Our evidence shows that the extent of local linkages indeed   17 
reduces the wage elasticity of labour demand for foreign owned plants.  In robustness 
checks we find that the results hold when allowing for plant heterogeneity in terms of size, 
for alternative measures of local linkages (e.g. the level of locally sourced inputs per 
employee), when taking account of exit, and when allowing for different lag structures in 
the labour demand equation. 
While our labour demand estimations show that increasing the level of linkages may 
lead to economically significant reductions in foreign plants’ wage elasticities, it is also 
clear that even if a multinational sourced all of its inputs in Ireland it would still have a 
substantially higher elasticity than a comparable domestic plant.  Hence, while linkages are 
important in explaining differences in elasticities they are not sufficient to explain away the 
fact that foreign plants have higher wage elasticities than domestic plants.     18 
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Appendix I: Theory 
A1: Deriving the conditional labour demand elasticity 
A price taking firm firm has a production function with n inputs: 
) ,... ( 1 n x x f y =   (A1) 
The Lagrangian function for cost minimisation is: 
)] .. ( [ .. 1 2 2 1 1 n n n x x f y x w x w x w - + + + = l l   (A2) 
For each of the n factors we get a first order condition: 
) ,.. ( 1 n i i x x f w l =   (A3) 
Differentiating the production function and the n first order conditions with respect tol , w1 
and all the inputs we get the following system of equations: 
0 ...
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Applying Cramers rule where B is the Bordered Hessian above and B22 replaces the second 
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Using this definition of the elasticity of substitution
23 in (A5) along with the first order 
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A2: Upward sloping supply for other factors 
 
  We will assume there are only two factor in this case.  The elasticity of substitution 
in this case can is: 
) 2 (
) (





2 2 1 1 2 1
12 f f f f f f f x x
f x f x f f
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= s   (A7) 
 
The cost minimisation problem can be represented as above in matrix format except that we 
allow w2 to vary as well as w 1. That is we assume an exogenous change in the wage  leads 
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= s where B 22 is the determinant of the cofactor of the 























11 s s    22 
 
Also note in the two factor case from (A7) that: 
 
) ( 2 2 1 1 2 1
2 1 12
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A3: The unconditionat elasticity 
 
Next we look for the labour demand elasticity when output varies after an increase in the 
price of labour.  We assume that the price of output is fixed.   Mosak (1938) analyses the 
impact of a change in prices on factor and output demands for price taking firms.  Mosaks 
approach is more detailed and would allow us to calculate the substitution and scale effects 
separately.  For simplicity we assume that the production function is homogeneous of 
degree r where r is less than unity.  We will assume that fixed costs ensure an optimal size 
at a positive level of output for the firm.  The firm will maximise profits: 
 
F x w x w x x pf - - - 2 2 1 1 2 1 ) , (  (A9) 
 
The first order conditions are as in (A3) except lambda is now the output price p. 
 Differentiating the first order conditions with respect to x 1, x2 and w 1 and solving we get 













=     (A10) 
 
Our assumption that the production function is homogeneous of degree r implies the 
following: 
























r f - - =   (A13) 
 
Substituting A9-11 into (A5) the elasticity of substitution simplifies to to: 
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Substituting A9-11 into (A10) we get: 
 
] ) 1 )[( 1 (
] ) 1 [(
12 2 1
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- =    (A15) 
 
Using (A.14) in the denominator and again applying the first order condition, the own price 
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Appendix II: Data 
Table A1: Linkages defined as locally sourced inputs per employee, in thousand £ 
 
  1983    1998   
NACE  domestic  foreign  domestic  foreign 
15  185.9  113.7  178.1  202.9 
16  34.6  20.0  49.5  91.3 
17  11.5  18.4  14.8  20.5 
18  4.7  5.3  11.4  7.7 
19  18.5  7.4  86.3  196.4 
20  50.8    52.8  83.9 
21  27.5  29.1  36.3  51.4 
22  9.2  6.1  24.7  32.6 
23  34.7    131.5  29.6 
24  34.8  31.3  56.8  77.2 
25  14.0  13.0  34.2  32.9 
26  25.7  21.0  52.0  71.7 
27  43.2  87.6  28.8  90.8 
28  13.5  13.5  27.6  31.9 
29  16.5  20.6  36.2  26.1 
30  105.9  46.5  42.8  129.9 
31  8.1  17.7  21.6  30.6 
32  8.6  13.0  25.6  38.3 
33  8.7  23.9  31.6  36.0 
34  24.9  16.1  31.1  28.4 
35  21.2  10.3  10.7  27.7 
36  14.7  22.8  25.6  85.7 
Total  72.0  32.5  61.7  64.7 
 
Source: own calculations from Irish Expenditure Survey 
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Table 1: Development of backward linkages 
 
(locally sourced inputs divided by total inputs) 
 
    1983    1998   
NACE  Description  domestic  foreign  domestic  foreign 
15  Food & beverages  0.77  0.67  0.80  0.69 
16  Tobacco  0.47  0.32  0.38  0.64 
17  Textiles  0.26  0.33  0.37  0.30 
18  Wearing apparel  0.21  0.27  0.40  0.41 
19  Leather  0.51  0.34  0.56  0.72 
20  Wood & wood products  0.47    0.53  0.61 
21  Pulp & paper  0.42  0.29  0.50  0.33 
22  Publishing & printing  0.25  0.32  0.55  0.48 
23  Petroleum   0.48    0.31  0.22 
24  Chemicals  0.44  0.35  0.57  0.39 
25  Rubber & plastics  0.33  0.27  0.46  0.37 
26  Non metallic minerals  0.48  0.38  0.69  0.51 
27  Basic metals  0.63  0.90  0.57  0.30 
28  Fabricated metals  0.31  0.27  0.49  0.38 
29  Machinery & equipment  0.46  0.33  0.48  0.37 
30  Computers & Office machinery  0.92  0.23  0.46  0.39 
31  Electrical machinery  0.31  0.35  0.49  0.34 
32  TV and telephone  0.26  0.19  0.47  0.34 
33  Medical & optical instruments  0.33  0.33  0.59  0.41 
34  Motor vehicles  0.27  0.31  0.40  0.46 
35  Other transport equipment  0.24  0.09  0.28  0.45 
36  Not elsewhere classified  0.40  0.60  0.51  0.53 
  Total  0.48  0.36  0.56  0.42 
 
Source: own calculations from Irish Expenditure Survey   26 
 
Table 2: Labour demand elasticities, foreign vs domestic 
 
  (1)  (2) 
l_l(t-1)  0.812  0.914 
  (0.009)***  (0.008)*** 
l_l(t-2)  -0.028  -0.024 
  (0.005)***  (0.005)*** 
l_w  -0.317  -0.532 
  (0.015)***  (0.015)*** 
l_y  0.185  0.369 
  (0.010)***  (0.011)*** 
l_w(t-1)    0.353 
    (0.012)*** 
l_y(t-1)    -0.237 
    (0.010)*** 
l_w(t-2)    0.007 
    (0.005) 
l_y(t-2)    -0.046 
    (0.004)*** 
own  0.202  0.053 
  (0.065)***  (0.053) 
l_y * own  -0.007  0.011 
  (0.010)  (0.008) 
l_w * own  -0.037  -0.046 
  (0.013)***  (0.010)*** 
Sargan test (p-value)  0.18  0.12 
AR(2) test (p-value)  0.32  0.19 
Observations  9717  9717 
Number of plants  1691  1691 
 
System GMM estimation 
Standard errors in parentheses 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 3: Conditional labour demand including backward linkages 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  all firms  all MNEs  domestic 
l_l(t-1)  0.817  0.825  0.796 
  (0.010)***  (0.001)***  (0.005)*** 
l_l(t-2)  -0.038  -0.047  -0.049 
  (0.005)***  (0.000)***  (0.003)*** 
l_w  -0.281  -0.412  -0.223 
  (0.015)***  (0.002)***  (0.009)*** 
l_y  0.175  0.187  0.220 
  (0.009)***  (0.000)***  (0.007)*** 
local_link  -0.058  0.139  0.360 
  (0.088)  (0.005)***  (0.052)*** 
l_y * local_link  0.009  -0.041  -0.057 
  (0.014)  (0.001)***  (0.009)*** 
l_w * local_link  -0.020  0.118  0.008 
  (0.022)  (0.003)***  (0.012) 
Sargan test (p-value)  0.16  0.61  0.35 
AR(2) test (p-value)  0.49  0.18  0.11 
Observations  9716  4320  5396 
Number of plants  1691  612  1079 
 
System GMM estimation 
Linkage defined as inputs sourced in Ireland divided by total inputs 
Standard errors in parentheses 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   28 
 
Table 4: Robustness checks: Estimations by size classes 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  small MNEs  medium 
MNEs 






l_l(t-1)  0.620  0.579  0.755  0.695  0.413  0.728 
  (0.001)***  (0.004)***  (0.005)***  (0.002)***  (0.000)***  (0.001)*** 
l_l(t-2)  -0.034  -0.036  -0.037  -0.117  0.012  -0.010 
  (0.001)***  (0.002)***  (0.004)***  (0.001)***  (0.000)***  (0.001)*** 
l_w  -0.674  -0.441  -0.336  -0.152  -0.249  -0.262 
  (0.003)***  (0.006)***  (0.007)***  (0.004)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)*** 
l_y  0.264  0.207  0.191  0.183  0.273  0.215 
  (0.002)***  (0.003)***  (0.003)***  (0.003)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)*** 
local_link  0.680  0.677  0.252  0.057  0.786  0.584 
  (0.022)***  (0.049)***  (0.050)***  (0.030)*  (0.002)***  (0.007)*** 
l_y * 
local_link 
-0.181  -0.186  -0.054  0.001  -0.137  -0.086 
  (0.004)***  (0.006)***  (0.006)***  (0.005)  (0.001)***  (0.001)*** 
l_w * 
local_link 
0.320  0.382  0.120  -0.057  0.073  0.048 
  (0.007)***  (0.008)***  (0.012)***  (0.006)***  (0.001)***  (0.003)*** 
Sargan test 
(p-value) 
1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
AR(2) test 
(p-value) 
0.05  0.91  0.21  0.02  0.40  0.33 
Observations  1177  1459  1684  1375  1850  2171 
Number of 
plants 
283  308  236  505  521  420 
 
System GMM estimation 
Linkages defined linkage as inputs sourced in Ireland divided by total inputs 
Standard errors in parentheses 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Definition of size classes: 
small: employment less than 33 percentile (65 respectively 35 for foreign and domestic) 
    medium: employment between 33 and 66 percentile 
large: employment larger than 66 percentile (162 respectively 65 for foreign and domestic)   29 
 
Table 5: Robustness checks: Alternative linkage definition 
 
  (1)  (2) 
  all MNEs  domestic 
l_l(t-1)  0.805  0.733 
  (0.000)***  (0.001)*** 
l_l(t-2)  -0.042  -0.037 
  (0.000)***  (0.001)*** 
l_w  -0.362  -0.219 
  (0.001)***  (0.002)*** 
l_y  0.192  0.229 
  (0.000)***  (0.001)*** 
local_link  -0.002  -0.003 
  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
l_y * local_link  0.000  0.000 
  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
l_w * local_link  0.0002  0.0001 
  (0.000)***  (0.000) 
Sargan test (p-value)  0.70  0.24 
AR(2) test (p-value)  0.19  0.18 
Observations  4320  5397 
Number of plants  612  1079 
 
System GMM estimation 
Linkage defined as inputs sourced in Ireland divided by total employment 
Standard errors in parentheses 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 6: Robustness checks: Considering exit in conditional labour demand 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  all MNEs   domestic   all MNEs   domestic   all MNEs   domestic  
L.  0.823  0.802  0.826  0.778  0.812  0.776 
  (0.001)***  (0.004)***  (0.001)***  (0.004)***  (0.001)***  (0.004)*** 
L2.  -0.046  -0.042  -0.051  -0.040  -0.032  -0.044 
  (0.000)***  (0.002)***  (0.000)***  (0.002)***  (0.001)***  (0.002)*** 
l_w  -0.409  -0.214  -0.400  -0.284  -0.415  -0.235 
  (0.002)***  (0.006)***  (0.001)***  (0.007)***  (0.001)***  (0.008)*** 
l_y  0.192  0.217  0.191  0.249  0.180  0.244 
  (0.001)***  (0.004)***  (0.001)***  (0.005)***  (0.001)***  (0.005)*** 
local_link  0.305  0.425  0.209  0.424  -0.024  0.482 
  (0.007)***  (0.033)***  (0.008)***  (0.039)***  (0.008)***  (0.039)*** 
l_y * local_link  -0.052  -0.064  -0.042  -0.087  -0.034  -0.084 
  (0.001)***  (0.006)***  (0.001)***  (0.007)***  (0.001)***  (0.007)*** 
l_w * local_link  0.101  0.002  0.103  0.073  0.148  0.037 
  (0.003)***  (0.009)  (0.002)***  (0.010)***  (0.003)***  (0.010)*** 
exit      -0.191  -0.036     
      (0.002)***  (0.009)***     
exitors          -0.308  0.167 
          (0.003)***  (0.022)*** 
Sargan test (p-
value) 
0.98  0.28  0.69  0.34  0.67  0.39 
AR(2) test (p-
value) 
0.19  0.18  0.19  0.14  0.14  0.15 
Observations  3953  4971  4258  5108  4301  5143 
Number of plants  552  981  604  1015  607  1018 
 
System GMM estimation 
Linkages defined linkage as inputs sourced in Ireland divided by total inputs 
Standard errors in parentheses 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 7: Robustness checks: alternative lag structure  
 
  (1)  (2) 
  all MNEs  domestic 
l_l(t-1)  0.922  -0.216 
  (0.001)***  (0.005)*** 
l_l(t-2)  -0.025  -0.028 
  (0.000)***  (0.003)*** 
l_w  -0.629  -0.445 
  (0.001)***  (0.011)*** 
l_y  0.419  0.392 
  (0.001)***  (0.008)*** 
l_w(t-1)  0.386  0.310 
  (0.001)***  (0.006)*** 
l_y(t-1)  -0.272  0.891 
  (0.001)***  (0.005)*** 
l_w(t-2)  0.004  -0.057 
  (0.001)***  (0.004)*** 
l_y(t-2)  -0.049  0.015 
  (0.001)***  (0.003)*** 
local_link  0.025  0.268 
  (0.007)***  (0.046)*** 
l_y * local_link  -0.022  -0.048 
  (0.001)***  (0.009)*** 
l_w * local_link  0.082  0.031 
  (0.002)***  (0.013)** 
Sargan test (p-value)  0.76  0.26 
AR(2) test (p-value)  0.08  0.20 
Observations  4320  5396 
Number of plants  612  1079 
 
System GMM estimation 
Linkage defined as inputs sourced in Ireland divided by total employment 
Standard errors in parentheses 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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